The Ukrainian "Diamond Prosecutor" Case Revisited

In the 2019 Trump impeachment hearings and 2020 Senate HGSAC hearings, the key U.S. officials (Victoria Nuland, Tony Blinken, former ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt and, especially, George Kent) all cited the “diamond prosecutors” case in summer 2015 as the proximate cause of the U.S. demand for Shokin’s dismissal.

Kent stated that ambassador Pyatt’s landmark speech in September 2015, which chastised the Prosecutor General Office and prepared the way for U.S. removal demands in November/December 2015, had been triggered by Shokin’s obfuscation of the diamond prosecutor case.

This explanation has been generally accepted by commentators who reject efforts to associate Shokin’s firing with Burisma and/or Hunter Biden.

However, there has been little to no critical examination of the “diamond prosecutor” case itself, even in the congressional hearings in which it was referred to. Why was it about this case that prompted U.S. officials to intervene so ostentatiously in the appointment and dismissal of a Ukrainian official with primarily domestic responsiblities?

Also, what happened to the diamond prosecutor case after Shokin was dismissed?

If Shokin had been obfuscating the diamond prosecutor case such that U.S. officials felt obliged to intervene, one would presume that, following Shokin’s removal, the case would have moved rapidly to conviction of the offenders. And that this rapid progress would have been closely monitored by U.S. State Department officials and even U.S. media.

Several weeks ago, I idly wondered: “what was the eventual outcome of the ‘diamond prosecutor’ case?

Answering the question wasn’t easy. I’ve spent days trying to re-construct the long arc of the diamond prosecutors case, primarily using online translations of Ukrainian reporting, doing dozens of site-specific google searches in Cyrillic of both obscure and non-obscure sites.

The bottom line: nine years since the original arrest, the “diamond prosecutors” case remains undecided. Court proceedings stalled years ago. In 14 months, the statute of limitations will expire. To the extent that anything was done in this case, it was done during Shokin’s term as Prosecutor General or in the momentum of the subsequent six months.

By the time that U.S. State Department officials were testifying at the 2019 impeachment and 2020 HGSAC hearings, the “diamond prosecutor” case had more or less totally stalled under Shokin’s successors. But none of the State Department officials reported this. Nor did any of the lawyers or congressmen ask them a single question about the progress and outcome of the diamond prosecutors.

From my review of events, the “diamond prosecutor” case did not provide a legitimate reason for U.S. State Department officials to demand Shokin’s removal (let alone so vociferously). On the other hand, it is also clear that they were demanding Shokin’s removal prior to demands from Burisma and Hunter Biden for “deliverables”. In my opinion, the most likely explanation is that the U.S. demand for Shokin’s head arose from his resistance to the “lustration” program backed by the U.S. embassy and Soros NGOs - a program which (as recently reported by New York Times) had already been carried out at the Ukrainian SBU (security police) in coordination with the CIA - and that the “diamond prosecutor” case was a cudgel to remove Shokin, quickly forgotten once he was wrongfully removed.

Illegal “Sand Mining”

The “diamond prosecutors” case had its origin in an unglamorous dispute about allegedly illegal sand mining near Pogreby village in Kyiv region - see map below.

Hydroekorsurs (Hydro-eco-resource), a private company, appears to have had some sort of agreement with the municipality to clear the Pogrebskii drainage channel, receiving a sand mixture which it could sell as compensation, rather than payment from the municipality. Under the guise of clearing the drainage channel, the operation was carried out without a permit for sand mining (a profitable enterprise in the Kyiv area.) Government inspectors, unsurprisingly, investigated the operation for illegally sand mining without a permit.

The Hydroekorsurs company had a sketchy setup. It had been incorporated by Oleksandr Kyrylenko, a lawyer and important figure in subsequent events. Kyrylenko was the only person named on official documents, but it had three “unofficial co-owners” not named on official documents. Two of the co-owners - Andriy Guz and Yuriy Baranovich - had put up money to finance the dredge used in the operation. Both were long-time friends/acquaintances of Vyacheslav Konstaninovsky, a prominent local oligarch and member of parliament, who later played an important role in events. Kyrylenko was responsible for inspections carried out by law enforcement and control bodies.

The fourth co-owner was Valentyn Rak, whose specific contribution to the enterprise is unclear. Rak subsequently becomes a central figure in the case: without him, there was no link between the sand mining operation and the “diamond prosecutors”. Rak was the intermediary who arranged the alleged payment to the diamond prosecutors (whose identity was unknown to the other co-owners) and through whom the bribes were supposedly paid.

Rak’s background, to say the least, was extremely shady. In June 2014 (only ten months before the opening incident in this case), Rak had been convicted of a large-scale fraud in which had defrauded a victim of $370,000 under false pretenses. Rak’s appeal was denied by regional court of appeals in June 2016 and by Ukrainian Supreme court in July 2019. Here is a short summary:

According to the case file, Rak and his accomplice Andriy Zakharchenko convinced a man to lend them $200,000. As a guarantee for the return of funds, the borrower was given a state deed for a plot of land, the owner of which was Rak's wife. At the same time, Rak convinced the borrower not to enter into a pledge agreement. Later, Rak and his accomplice allegedly borrowed another 170,000 dollars and 50,000 UAH from the same man. In return, they promised to include the borrower's wife in the company, which will issue a lease for a granite quarry in the Zhytomyr region. The money was not returned.

Rak was sentenced to 5 years of imprisonment with confiscation, and Zakharchenko - to 7 years with confiscation.

The April 9, 2015 Incident

Matters seem to have come to a head on April 9, 2015, less than two months after Shokin’s appointment as Prosecutor General on Feb 15, 2015, when a government official, accompanied by “people in balaclavas” (also described as “50 people from Azov”) forcibly removed the dredger and stopped the operation.

Kyrylenko described the incident in May 2016 as follows:

"In April, police officers and prosecutors simply took away the dredger without any decision and blocked the work," said Mr. Kyrylenko…

and in August 2021 as follows:

When 50 people from Azov with law enforcement agencies arrive, overturn your car and cut the wheels, and the law enforcement agency is behind it. What do you think the pressure is?!

The senior on-scene official appears to have been Alexander Kurko, an employee of the Kyiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office, later interviewed in court in August 2017, where he testified that his concern was illegal sand mining and that he knew nothing about any prosecutor receiving any benefits related to the case.

Guz and/or Baranovich immediately contacted their friend, member of parliament Vyacheslav Konstantinovsky, who arrived on the scene in the evening, witnessing the mob of men in “balaclavas”. One or more videos of the event was taken.

Subsequently, member of parliament Konstantinovsky went to Davit Sakvarelidze, a Biden cadre from Georgia who had recently (March 2015) been appointed as Deputy Prosecutor General, with whom he was acquainted. Konstantinovsky showed a video with “people in balaclavas”. Sakvarelidze recognized an investigator in the video (presumably Kurko) and offered to help.¹

The Arrests - July 5, 2015

Guz and Baranovich urgently wanted to get their dredge back and resume operations. At some point in the next three months (and precise timing is unclear on present record), Rak told them that the problem was with the prosecutors. According to Rak’s later testimony, Rak contacted “entrepeneur” Valeriy Hybalenko about recovering the dredge and “Hybalenko offered legal assistance to the company in the courts, in the search for a dredger, in the repair of a dredger”, but there would be costs. Rak explained to Guz and Baranovich that the amount required to “solve” the problem would be $200,000 in three tranches: a first tranche of $50,000; a second tranche of $100,000 and a third tranche of $50,000 after the case was dismissed. Rak didn’t give any names to Guz or Baranovich.

According to the later indictment, Rak transferred the first tranche of $50,000 to Hybalenko on June 26, 2015, who then transferred $50,000 to Korniets and Shapakin on June 27, 2015. Sakvarelidze stated in an interview that the exchanges were under “covert surveillance”. (However, no witnesses to the exchange have thus far been produced in hearings to date.) On the following week (July 3, 2015), according to the indictment, Rak transferred the next tranche of $100,000 to Hybalenko; Hybalenko then met with Korniets, but Korniets noticed the surveillance and the transfer didn’t take place.

Then,on July 5, 2015, in a major operation, the two “diamond prosecutors” - Oleksandr Korniyets, then deputy prosecutor of the Kyiv region and Volodymyr Shapakin, then first deputy head of the Main Investigation Department of the Prosecutor General Office) were arrested on suspicion of taking bribes to close the investigation into illegal sand mining. The arrests were carried out by the “Alpha” (Counter-Terrorist) unit of the Ukrainian SBU under Sakvarelidze’s authority. Hybalenko was also arrested. The arrests were accompanied by high-profile searches of the homes and offices of the two prosecutors, in which the SBU reportedly broke down office doors in the Prosecutor General Office building. At the time, Shokin was in the U.S. for surgery and out of action.

Meanwhile, the SBU announced that they had recovered $500,000 in cash from Shapakin’s home and 500,000 hyrvynias ($15,000) in diamonds from Korniets. The story, needless to say, got huge coverage in Ukraine².

The timing of events between the seizure of the dredge on April 9 and the SBU raid and arrests at the Prosecutor General Office on July 5 is murky. In a March 2016 interview³, Sakvarelidze stated that he contacted “head of the SBU Hyrtsak” after he had met with one of the Hydroekosurs co-owners (probably Kyrylenko) in a follow up to Konstantinovsky’s complaint. At a time when Shokin was “in America” for surgery.

the applicant [presumably one of Kyrylenko, Guz or Baranovich] came and said: "They need me." … I told him: "Write an application." The man was very scared, his hands were really shaking. I sent an SMS to the head of the SBU Hrytsak and said: "I need your operational support and the most trusted, reliable people." …

Shokin was then in America, he was operated on. I say that trusted people are needed. He sent me Viktor Trepak and his guys. They took on this matter very competently - 120 operatives, investigators, special forces "Alfa" and so on..

Hyrtsak had become acting head of SBU on June 18, 2015, after the resignation of his predecessor Valentyn Nalyvaichenko on June 16, 2015. (Nalyvaichenko featured prominently in the recent New York Times story (link) on the CIA as the Ukrainian official who embedded the CIA in Ukrainian intelligence operations after the Maidan regime change coup in February 2014.)

If Hyrtsak was “head of the SBU” when contacted by Sakvarelidze about the sand mining operation, the schedule of events is remarkably compressed. The payoff operation began one week after Hyrtsak’s appointment - only a few days after Sakvarelidze had contacted the SBU. It’s a remarkable coincidence (or not) that the payoffs were not initiated until after Sakvarelidze had arranged for SBU surveillance. (One can help but wonder whether the SBU surveillance team were wearing khaki pants, navy blue shirts and aviator sunglasses.)

The SBU surveillance and raid of the Prosecutor General Office also took place in the context of a festering dispute between SBU and the Prosecutor General Office, which had resulted in Nalyviachenko’s resignation only a few days previously. A dispute which (by coincidence or not) touched on an incident involvement Biden cadre Michael Carpenter, Elizabeth Zentos and “whistleblower” Eric Ciaramella.

On June 12, 2015, SBU chairman Nalyvaichenko had publicly charged that a former Deputy Prosecutor General⁴ was co-owner of an illegal oil depot, at which a serious fire had killed five people in early June. Nalyvaichenko didn’t name the official. The Prosecutor General Office immediately issued a subpoena to Nalyvaichenko, thus preventing him from attending a June 15, 2015 meeting in Washington with Ciaramella, Zentos and Carpenter. Ukrainian official Naida attended in his stead.⁵

On June 15, 2015, Nalyvaichenko identified Anatoly Danilenko as the former Deputy Prosecutor General in question⁶,⁷. Danilenko was the Ukrainian prosecutor who had supposedly told George Kent about Burisma bribes in early February 2015. When Shokin became Prosecutor General in mid-February 2015, Danilenko resigned (presumably at Shokin’s request.) Once Danilenko was identified as a person of interest, the Prosecutor General Office immediately determined that Danilenko did not have any connection to the oil depot or the fire. Nalyvaichenko resigned as head of SBU on June 16.⁸ He had given a lengthy interview a few days earlier.⁹ He still remained an important figure in Ukrainian politics and re-appeared a few years as author of an October 2019 Wall St Journal editorial¹⁰ endorsing the investigation of payments to Hunter Biden.

On June 18, 2015, Vasyl Hyrtsak was appointed head of SBU. Previously, he had led SBU Counter-terrorism, which included Alpha Group. Hyrtsak assigned Viktor Trepak to lead the operation on behalf of SBU. Trepak later had an important role in the Black Ledger operation: it was Trepak - not Leshchenko - who announced the existence of the notorious “Black Ledger” in early June 2016, which Trepak claimed to have received it in an anonymous package several weeks earlier. Trepak turned the documents over to Artem Sytnyk at NABU (who had been one of the attendees at the January 2016 Washington meeting between U.S. officials, Biden cadres and Ukrainian prosecutors favored by the U.S. administration in Ukraine.)

Thus, the sensational July 5, 2015 arrests of the two prosecutors, together with military-style SBU raids on their homes and offices, including the unusual spectacle of SBU breaking into offices in the Prosecutor General building, took place within a few weeks of the Prosecutor General preventing the SBU head from traveling to Washington and the Nalyvaichenko’s forced resignation.

It also appears that Sakvarelidze was liaising with the U.S. embassy on his operations, but not his ostensible superiors at the Prosecutor General Office. First Deputy Prosecutor General Huzyr, in charge during Shokin’s absence, immediately opened an investigation into who authorized the raid by Sakvarelidze and the SBU, as Sakvarelidze does not appear to have obtained authorization from his superiors at the Prosecutor General Office or to have even informed them. The circus, needless to say, got huge coverage in Ukraine.

While Sakvarelidze’s actions took senior management at the Prosecutor General Office by surprise, it appears almost certain that Sakvarelidze had briefed George Kent and/or Jeffrey Cole at the U.S. Embassy. We know for certain that, on June 11, 2015, Sakvarelidze had sent an email to [Jeffrey Cole] of the U.S. embassy reporting the arrest of an obscure prosecutor in Poltava. Sakvarelidze’s email was forwarded by [Cole] to George Kent, and thence to Rob Storch (Michael Horowitz’ deputy IG) and then to Horowitz himself. Kent mentioned the Poltava incident in his testimony.

While there hasn’t been any production of documents proving that Sakvarelidze was briefing U.S. embassy officials on his operation against the “diamond prosecutors”, it defies logic that Sakvarelidze would have reported to them on the minor Poltava arrest but not on the “diamond prosecutor” incident. One can also see how Sakvarelidze’s coziness with U.S. embassy officials, while snubbing his ostensible superiors at the Prosecutor General Office, would be a recipe for dissension.

Back to the narrative.

On July 6, 2015 (the day following the searches), Poroshenko summoned¹¹ Hrytsak (SBU), Sakvarelidze and Huzyr to his office and tried to get everyone to play nice: he told Huzyr to shut down the investigation into whether the raid was properly legal; he told Sakvarelidze to remove his Facebook post asserting “rampant” corruption in the Prosecutor General Office; and issued his own Facebook post with everyone at the same table.

Shokin returned to Ukraine about July 10, 2015.

On July 14, 2015, Poroshenko met with both Sakvarelidze and Shokin¹² as there were still festering issues - see picture below from Poroshenko’s Facebook. On July 10, 2015, the Kyiv Post (reflecting opinions of the NGOs) had called for Shokin’s resignation - one of the earliest manifestations of the increasing ambitions of Sakvarelidze and Vitaliy Kasko, another opportunistic young Deputy Prosecutor General also backed by the U.S. embassy.¹³ Sakvarelidze and Kasko emerged ascendant from the meeting.¹⁴ On July 16, 2015, both prosecutors (Korniets and Shapakin) were fired. The Prosecutor General Office also announced that the ongoing investigation would be under the direction of Sakvarelidze and Kasko¹⁵. Two weeks later, it was announced that First Deputy Prosecutor General Huzyr had submitted his resignation.

Meanwhile, both Sakvarelidze and Vitaliy Kasko, the other Deputy Prosecutor General who was coordinating with the US embassy, gave multiple public interviews pouring salt onto the wounds of their superiors¹⁶.

The September 2015 Pyatt Speech and Aftermath

Eight weeks later, in September 2015, U.S. ambassador Pyatt made a landmark speech¹⁷ in which he accused the Prosecutor General Office (i.e. Shokin) of “aggressively undermining reform”, while “applaud[ing]” the work of Sakvarelidze and Kasko, both then reporting to the US Embassy:

Pyatt’s speech was subsequently cited by U.S. officials as evidence that State Department demands for Shokin’s resignation originated well before Biden’s trip to Ukraine in December 2015 and, more importantly in regard to subsequent controversy, prior to Burisma’s demand for “deliverables” from Hunter Biden in late October 2015.

In his 2020 testimony to a Senate subcommittee, Pyatt was asked about the origin of his September 2015 speech. He gave credit to the “INL [International Narcotics and Law Enforcement] office, which was generously funded by the Assistant Secretary [Victoria Nuland]”. As noted above (see the June 11, 2015 email), Deputy Prosecutor General Sakvarelidze was reporting to the INL office, whose perspective on the inter-necine intrigues within the Ukrainian Prosecutor General Office were shaped by what they were told by Sakvarelidze and Kasko (a point made elsewhere in the 2020 testimony by State Department officials.)

In August and September 2015, Kasko and Sakvarelidze were feuding with Shokin and the Prosecutor General Office over several other issues considerably more consequential than the diamond prosecutor case - the context of which is too complicated to review in this already too lengthy article.

One dispute was over the “special confiscation” law proposed by Tetiana Chornovol (and supported by Shokin) to facilitate seizure of funds believed to have been embezzled by oligarchs who had fled Ukraine. Chornovol’s proposal was opposed by U.S. officials. In particular, on September 14, 2015, Mary Butler of DOJ MLARS wrote to Kasko and Daria Kaleniuk, Executive Director of an NGO backed by both the State Department and Soros, to express opposition to the bill.¹⁸ (The choice of recipients is curious: Butler wrote to Kasko (not Prosecutor General Shokin) and to a US-backed NGO.) The proposed legislation was defeated.

A second contemporary dispute was over efforts by Elena Tyshchenko (then recently reported to lead asset recovery efforts on behalf of Ministry of Internal Affairs), Chornovol and Shokin to recover $80.5 million in funds frozen in Latvia, the recovery of which was under Kasko’s jurisdiction, but, according to Chornovol, not being pursued. In August and early September, in the period leading up to Pyatt’s speech, there was a bitter fight with Kasko over his apparent failure to take required steps to recover the funds, while simultaneously purporting to blame Shokin while reporting to the U.S. Embassy. On October 2, 2015, Chornovol published a bitter account of her experience with Kasko (link)¹⁹²⁰. The Latvian information on money-laundering came into closer view four years later when Andrii Derkach (who was later sanctioned by “Trump” administration) revealed that the Burisma payments to Hunter Biden, Devon Archer and others were made from Latvian bank accounts of offshore companies and had been reported to Ukrainian authorities as potential money laundering. These Latvian transactions were exactly the sort of transaction that ostensibly interested U.S. officials concerned with money laundering, but were ignored at the time.

The criminal investigation of the prosecutors continued actively in the next few months. In October 2015, Kasko filed suspicions against Korniets in an unrelated incident.²¹

The first (thus far) expressly documented demand for Shokin’s resignation within State Department documents occurred on a month later, on November 22, 2015, in a Talking Points memo prepared for Biden’s then forthcoming trip to Ukraine. See my X thread on this memo,²² which originated in Bridget Brink’s section. The memo was distributed by a redacted official, identified in my thread as Jamie Gusack, a recent transferee to Brink’s section. In January 2016, the Ukrainian prosecutors met with Brink and Gusack subsequent to their better known meeting with Ciaramella and Zentos. It is my belief (as articulated in a X thread) that the association of the demand for Shokin’s resignation with approval of the $1 billion loan was first articulated at the meeting of the Ukrainian prosecutors with Brink and Gusack (taking Ciaramella by surprise as evidenced by the “yikes” email.)

As is now well known, in his trip to Ukraine on December 6-9, 2015, Biden issued this demand to Ukrainian parliamentarians and officials. Daria Kaleniuk of AntAC had visited officials in Washington on December 1, a few days earlier. And Leshchenko visited officials in Washington a few days after the trip.

The idea of a visit to Washington by the Ukrainian prosecutors most closely linked to the U.S. administration appears to have developed in December 2015 in the wake of Biden’s trip to Ukraine. Invitations were issued to Sakvarelidze, Kasko, the recently appointed NABU head (Artem Sytnyl) and the just appointed Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor (Nazar Kholodnitsky). U.S. officials do not appear to have invited Prosecutor General Shokin and it is unclear whether they even sought Shokin’s permission in advance. By this time, Kasko and Shokin were in more or less open warfare and Shokin refused exit permission to Kasko (but permitted Sakvarelidze to go). At the January 2016 meetings, the two main interests of U.S. officials were later reported to have been: (1) getting the Ukrainian prosecutors to get money-laundering dirt on Paul Manafort; (2) firing Shokin.

Diamond Prosecutor Case Progress

Shokin Period - July 2015 to March 2016

Rather than the “diamond prosecutor” case being stalled, on January 4, 2016, the suspicions registered in July 2015 were crystallized into indictments against Shapakin, Korniets and Hybalenko in the Pechersky court.²³ One day later (January 5, 2016), the Pechersky court pronounced itself unable to identify enough unconflicted judges available for the trial and referred the case to the Kyiv Court of Appeals for resolution. After some legal manoeuvring, the case was sent to a different Kyiv court - the Holosiivskiy Court of Kyiv - which, by March 10, 2016, had assigned a panel of three judges²⁴.

Meanwhile, an investigation into Kasko by the Prosecutor General Office revealed that he had obtained valuable apartment real estate in questionable transactions.²⁵ Kasko resigned in mid-February 2016, excoriating Shokin on the way out. Concurrent with Kasko’s exit, Biden ratcheted up the pressure on Poroshenko to obtain Shokin’s resignation in a telephone call, a tape of which was released in May 2020 by Andrii Derkach (who was subsequently sanctioned by the “Trump” administration.)

Consideration of the case began on March 21, 2016. Korniets and Shapakin were arraigned on March 23, 2016 and pled not guilty. Korniets claimed: “Not a single hryvnia or dollar that is related to this criminal proceeding was confiscated from either me or Shapakin. Therefore, I believe that (this is) fiction and a lie. Not a single evidence of the transfer of funds to me from any person in the materials There are no criminal proceedings. Not a single piece of evidence of my meeting with entrepreneurs or other persons exists in the case materials".

Sakvarelidze continued to publicly excoriate Shokin. On March 24, 2016, Sakvarelidze publicly asserted²⁶ that Shokin himself was corruptly connected to Korniets. By then, Shokin was in his final days as Prosecutor General - he was removed on March 30, 2016. However, on March 28, 2016, in one of his final acts at Prosecutor General, Shokin fired the disloyal Sakvarelidze (who remain fired, even after Shokin’s removal.)

Prosecutor Yuri Simonov, who had been assigned to the case by Sakvarelidze/Kasko, continued as lead prosecutor throughout the case.

Lutsenko Period- May 2016 to Sep 2019

Lutsenko was Prosecutor General from May 2016 to September 2019.

The first publicly reported court examination of witnesses (two) in the “diamond prosecutors” case took place on May 10, 2016. In the Ukrainian system, trials do not take place on consecutive days, but, in the case, once a month or every few months at best. It’s hard to imagine a more chaotic system.

Member of parliament Konstantinovsky testified²⁷ about his arrival at the melee on April 9, 2015. He said that he had known Guz and Baranevich for about 15 years, that Guz had called him on April 9, 2015 complaining about the arrival of “police and SBU employees”, that he had gone to the site where he witnessed “men in balaclavas”, that the company gave him a video of events which he took to Sakvarelidze, identifying an official [presumably Kurko] from the PGO and that Sakvarelize undertook to figure out what was going on. (Also see contemporary interview with Konstantinovsky²⁸).

The second witness on May 10, 2016 was company lawyer and co-owner Kyrylenko. Kyrylenko stated²⁹ that "in April, police officers and prosecutors simply took away the dredge without any decision and blocked the work" and “that representatives of the prosecutor's office demanded $200,000 from the company's management through an intermediary so that ‘the issue was resolved at the level of the regional and General prosecutor's offices.’” BBC reported³⁰ that “the representative of the company [Kyrylenko] was interrogated for almost two hours, but he did not testify specifically about the transfer of the bribe, as well as about who exactly demanded it”.

In other words, neither of the opening witnesses connected either Shapakin or Korniets to the bribe.

After the day’s proceedings, BBC interviewed Sakvarelidze, Kasko (both of whom attended the examination despite having been removed) and prosecutor Simonov . BBC Ukraine reported³¹:

He [Sakvarelidze] believes that the most important thing in this case is not even the testimony of witnesses, but the evidence - materials of secret investigative actions during the controlled transfer of bribes.

Mr. Kasko also assured that the diamonds are in the materials of the criminal case, but they are not evidence during the court process, but only seized property value.

State prosecutor Yanis Simonov told journalists after the meeting that the next witnesses will tell about the circumstances of the case and the transfer of bribes.

The next meeting, where the questioning of prosecution witnesses will continue, is scheduled for May 18.

After hearing the prosecution's witnesses, the court will study the evidence in the case, and after that the questioning of the defense's witnesses will begin.

On May 13, 2016, Korniets was beaten up by assailants in Kyiv. The next reported hearing was on June 13, 2016.

On June 13, 2016, company co-owner Baranovich testified³² that “that the company was not engaged in sand mining, but was engaged in cleaning the bottom of reservoirs, however, during numerous inspections, none of the inspectors wanted to look at the documents” and that “over time the management of the enterprise was told the amount of “resolving the issue” - 200 thousand dollars… in three stages. At the first stage, 50 thousand dollars were paid to unlock and remove security from the facility, another 100 thousand were supposed to be paid for closing criminal cases, returning documentation, and another 50 thousand dollars were to be transferred upon completion of the above procedures.”

Thus, despite Sakvarelidze’s promise of testimony about “covert” transfers, Baranovich’s testimony on June 13, 2016 did not connect the bribes to either of the two prosecutors, or, for that matter, even to co-defendant Hybalenko.

Ten days later, the appeal of the 2014 fraud conviction of Valentyn Rak, the key intermediary, was denied by the Vinnytsia Court of Appeal.³³

On August 15, 2016, three more witnesses (unidentified in contemporary reporting) were questioned by the court. “Each of them told the court that they did not recognize the accused”.³⁴ This reporting also stated that five witnesses were scheduled for August 23, 2016, but there does not seem to be any contemporary reporting on this.

In September 2016, one of the three judges on the panel (Drozdova) was dismissed due to health reasons. The nominee replacement (Rudyk) recused himself. Oleksandr Boyko was appointed as third judge. The replacement of one of the three judges resulted in the defense having the right to require re-examination of all witnesses from the beginning, but this does not seem to have taken place.³⁵

On November 9, 2016, two witnesses were reported to have been examined , but nothing relevant to the criminal case was reported.

The next information on proceedings is three months later. In February 2017, a PGO prosecutor involved in checking the legality of sand mining, “did not say anything useful for the criminal case”.³⁶

In February 2017, in a development not directly related to the case, Dmytro Neskoromnoy, the leader of the SBU operation against the “diamond prosecutors” in June-July 2015, was dismissed from the position of deputy head of the "K" Department of the SBU for corrupt actions earlier in 2015.³⁷

The case appears to have been inactive for the next six months, in part due to scheduling conflicts among the three judges.³⁸

In August 2017, Alexander Kurko, the PGO employee who attended the melee on April 9, 2015 was examined. Contemporary reporting stated: “Kurko did not give any testimony about the former employees of the prosecutor's office receiving undue benefits for closing the case of illegal sand mining. ‘Nothing is known’, witness Kurko answered the question of GPU prosecutor Alexander Proskurnikov.”³⁹

Two months passed. A scheduled hearing on October 23, 2017 was adjourned because (1) one of the judges had a scheduling conflict; and (2) neither of the witnesses (deputy head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Vadym Troyan, and first deputy prosecutor of the Kyiv region, Ihor Hrabets) showed up. Prosecutor Simonov blamed the court for not issuing summons.

On November 13, 2017, Hrabets was examined. He testified that he had been acting prosecutor of Kyiv region in April 2015 and had been aware of active investigation of illegal sand mining in Kyiv region under Korniets’ direction, stating that active investigations were done on the basis of a court ruling:

In 2015, circumstances developed such that for 4 or 5 months I acted as the prosecutor of the Kiev region. Powers between deputy prosecutors regions are clearly distributed. Therefore, I was responsible for my direction as the first deputy prosecutor of the region. The specified powers of the former prosecutor - I realized that this was temporary... I learned about the criminal proceedings regarding illegal sand mining in the Kiev region from numerous parliamentary appeals that came at that time. , and in connection with the preparation of answers, since the answers are prepared with the signature of the head at the address of the people's deputy, Korniets reported on the case and, as a rule, on those days when active investigative actions were carried out on the basis of a court ruling, searches, reviews, and seizure of equipment directly. at the scene of the crime. It’s difficult for me to tell you in more detail now

Hrabets was unable to “confirm receipt of a bribe” by either of the two prosecutors.⁴⁰

The next scheduled witness was co-owner Valentyn Rak, who had been the supposed intermediary to the defendants. Six months passed before Rak’s belated appearance.

First, Rak failed to show up for a scheduled appearance on January 24, 2018.⁴¹ Two months passed. Then, on March 24, 2018, Rak once again failed to appear. According to contemporary reporting, the judges stated that this was the 10th time that Rak had failed to appear; this time, the court issued a warrant requiring his appearance at next session. Prosecutor Simonov said that Rak was in attendance, but that his lawyer wasn’t there.

On May 3, 2018, Rak finally appeared.⁴²

Rak testified that, after being informed by the other co-owners of the disappearance of the dredger, he contacted Hybalenko about locating and recovering the dredge. He said that Hybalenko introduced him to Shapakin and Korniets, but Korniets was unhelpful. He said that Hybalenko told him that it would cost $150,000 to recover the dredger, but said nothing about sending money to law enforcement agencies. After Guz and Baranovich put up the money, Rak handed $50,000 and later $100,000 to Hybalenko. Rak denied any knowledge of a bribe to law enforcement officials.

While Rak’s denial of any knowledge of a bribe seems implausible, the prosecution record at that point does not appear to have included any witness that actually linked the delivery of $150,000 to Shapakin and Korniets.

Two months passed. Rak was supposed to continue his testimony on July 18, 2018, but two of the judges were unavailable and the hearing was adjourned.⁴³ Rak never did finish his testimony.

Two months passed. Then, in September 2018, Judge Boyko, one of the three judges on the panel, was suspended by the High Council of Justice for driving while intoxicated. His replacement, Halyna Bondarenko, agreed to hear the case from the stage at which it was stopped, but she wanted to re-examine the key witness Rak.⁴⁴

Three months passed. Then, on December 3, 2018, Rak once again failed to appear. Prosecutor Simonov stated “that they could not contact the witness. Rak's relatives refused to talk to prosecutors, and the lawyer defending Rak himself from criminal prosecution promised to pass on the information. According to Simonov, Raka's phone is not answering.” The court once again issued a warrant compelling Rak’s appearance.⁴⁵

Seven weeks passed. Rak was scheduled to appear on January 20, 2019, but once again failed to appear. A contemporary report stated: “Judge Dmytro Valigura reported that Rak's wife [provided] a copy of the certificate that, since January 21, he has been undergoing inpatient examination and treatment in the psychiatric department of the hospital.” Prosecutor Simonov suggested that “if the health of the witness does not improve, the court can change the order and start examining the written evidence”. Judge Valigura ruled otherwise and placed the onus on the prosecution who had offered Rak as a key witness to demonstrate that his evidence “can be used as the basis of any procedural decision”:

"It is advisable to wait for Rak [to be] mentally healthy and with the appropriate document. This certificate changes a lot of what he told... The question of finding out the circumstances of how he got there [in mental hospital] is not within the competence of the court. This is a prosecution witness. The prosecution must not only ensure his appearance, but also prove that the words of the witness, the interrogation... can be used as the basis of any procedural decision".⁴⁶

Four months passed. The court once again convened to examine Rak on May 16, 2019, but Rak once again failed to show. This time, according to a contemporary report: “Prosecutor Simonov brought a certificate from the hospital that on January 21-23, [2019], Rak underwent an outpatient examination, according to the results of which no treatment was required.” Simonov said Rak “was supposed to appear at the hearing, because the day before he was invited to continue the interrogation, but he never came to the court.”⁴⁷ The case was adjourned once again.

Two months passed. On July 24, 2019, the court convened once again.⁴⁸ This time, both defendant prosecutors were absent for supposed medical reasons: Shapakin was recovering from surgery and Korniets’ sister was in the hospital. Once again, the hearing was adjourned.

Meanwhile, the next day (on July 25, 2019), Rak’s conviction for fraud (for which he had received a five year sentence) was upheld by the Supreme Court.⁴⁹ This is the last news of Rak.

By coincidence, July 25, 2019 was also the date of Trump’s fateful telephone call with then newly elected President Zelensky.

Riaboshapka Period - Sep 2019 to March 2020

On August 29, 2019, Ruslan Riaboshapka⁵⁰ was appointed as the new Prosecutor General. Kasko was re-appointed as Deputy Prosecutor General on September 5, 2019, followed soon after by the appointment of Viktor Trepak also as Deputy Prosecutor General on October 9, 2019. (Trepak had led the 2015 SBU operation in which Korniets and Shapakin had been arrested.)

On September 5, 2019, changes to the legislation governing the new High Anti-Corruption Court came into effect.⁵¹

Two months had passed since Rak’s non-appearance on July 25, 2019. A hearing was scheduled for September 25, 2019, but was adjourned because Hybalenko’s lawyer was absent.⁵²

On September 30, 2019, the prosecutor requested that the case be transferred to the High Anti-Corruption Court; the Holosiivsky court of Kyiv referred the request to the Kyiv Court of Appeals.⁵³ On October 18, 2019, the Kyiv Court of Appeals rejected the application and returned the case to the Holosiivsky court of Kyiv.⁵⁴

On November 4, 2019, the Holosiivsky court directly referred the case to the High Anti-Corruption Court anyway. The High Anti-Corruption Court accepted the case and assigned three judges on November 8, 2019.⁵⁵

However, on November 22, 2019, the Appellate Chamber of the High Anti-Corruption Court decided that the case did not fall under their jurisdiction and returned the case to the Holosiivsky court of Kyiv.⁵⁶

The Prosecutor General Office then asked the Kyiv Court of Appeals to transfer the case from the Holosiivsky Court of Kyiv to the Obolon Court of Kyiv, citing the “inefficiency” of the proceedings thus far.⁵⁷

While these machinations were taking place - three and one-half years since Shokin’s removal - George Kent was testifying at House impeachment hearings⁵⁸ that Shokin’s obfuscation of the diamond prosecutor case in summer 2015 had precipitated the State Department demand that Shokin be fired.

Three more months passed. Then, on February 18, 2020, the transfer of the diamond prosecutor case to the Obolon Court was granted⁵⁹. On February 27, 2020, Судовий репортер (sudreporter) published a useful review of the dismal proceedings, observing that almost 5 years had passed since the original rest and (presciently) pointed out that there were “only” another 5 years before the 10-year statute of limitations expired.⁶⁰

Venediktova Period - March 2020 to July 2022

In March 2020, Riaboshapka was removed as Prosecutor General and replaced by Irinia Venediktova. Her appointment more or less coincided with the transfer of the diamond prosecutor case from the Holosiivsky Court to the Obolon Court with new judges starting more or less from the beginning.

The transfer to the Obolon Court ushered in even slower proceedings. Ten months later (January 2021), the Obolon Court still hadn’t held its first hearing on the case.⁶¹

During this hiatus in the diamond prosecutor case, the Senate HGSAC hearings took place in summer 2020, during which multiple State Dept witnesses (Pyatt, Blinken, Nuland and George Kent himself) recited the supposed obfuscation of the "diamond prosecutor” case under Shokin without blinking.

On January 21, 2021, Korniets requested that the case be transferred to the Desnyansky Court of Kyiv, where a separate case against him and his sister were being heard. Prosecutor Simonov opposed the transfer on the grounds that it would result in further delay (notwithstanding fact that prosecution’s request that case be transferred to Obolon Court had already resulted in a year of delay.)⁶² On February 15, 2021, the Kyiv Court of Appeal rejected the transfer to the Desnyansky Court and returned the case to the Obolon Court.⁶³

On February 26, 2021, in a separate case, criminal investigation against Lev Trubnikov, Sakvarelidze’s lead SBU investigator in the diamond prosecutor case, for theft of seized property was extended in February 2015.⁶⁴

Two months passed. On April 22, 2021, in a television interview, Sakvarelidze and the then Prosecutor General Iryna Venediktova were asked about the diamond prosecutor case. Venediktova admitted that, six years later, the case had still not been heard.⁶⁵

Another month passed. It was now 15 months since the case had been transferred to Obolon Court in order to expedite it. On May 24, 2021, the Obolon court reported that it had completed its preparations and assigned the indicted case to a panel of three judges - Serhiy Rodionov, Inna Belokonnaya and Natalia Yatsenko. Prosecutor Simonov asked that the court first examine the “written evidence”, but the court determined that it would start with the questioning of witnesses.

Another month passed. On June 18, 2021, the Obolon court held its first hearing, to which five witnesses had been summoned. None appeared. Prosecutor Simonov stated:

"There is no data that witnesses have received subpoenas. As a prosecutor, I was not obliged to ensure the appearance of these witnesses. As a prosecutor, I have a completely different vision - I want to start with the materials, I am preparing a list of these pieces of evidence. The materials of the case are unchanged, but it is a large volume. Perhaps the list will be ready for the next meeting and I will ask to change the order," said prosecutor Simonov.

The case was adjourned.⁶⁶

Another month passed. On July 20, 2021, the first witness appeared before the Obolon Court (and the only witness that I have been able to identify in public reporting). Company co-owner and lawyer Oleksandr Kyrylenko (identified in the Sudreporter article as “a man named Oleksandr”), who had already testified in the Holosiivsky Court on May 10, 2016, five years earlier, gave testimony virtually identical to his previous testimony.

He first described the structure of Hydroecoresource, the accusations of illegal sand mining, the seizure of the dredge. Kyrylenko then testified that Rak had stated the amount of money necessary to settle the issue, but specific names of law enforcement officials were never mentioned. Kyrylenko said that he recognized defendant Hybalenko as someone that he had been introduced to by Rak as someone who had experience in resolving conflicts with law enforcement officials. Kyrylenko said that he “was not personally extorted” and “was not a witness to such an extortion”.⁶⁷ Kyrylenko described the mob of enforcers on April 9, 2015 as “50 people from Azov”⁶⁸ (a faction that was associated with Shokin’s opponents rather than Shokin himself):

When 50 people from Azov with law enforcement agencies arrive, overturn your car and cut the wheels, and the law enforcement agency is behind it. What pressure do you think?!

Four months passed. A hearing was scheduled on November 30, 2021, but was adjourned due to Korniets’ unavailability due to sickness.⁶⁹

Andriy Kostin - July 2022 to Present

In July 2022, Andriy Kostin was appointed as Prosecutor General, replacing Irina Venediktova. To my knowledge, there are no publicly documented interviews since his appointment.

However, on June 12, 2023, Shapakin was separately charged with presenting a false loan document⁷⁰ in two attempts to recover the cash seized during his 2015 arrest, originally in July 2015 and then again in July 2022:

The prosecutor, who was still in office, persuaded a businessman he knew to provide him with a false document stating that he allegedly borrowed 350,000 dollars from the businessman. Moreover, this loan agreement was drawn up retroactively. On the basis of the forged document, the law enforcement officer submitted an application to the General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine for the return of currency values ​​belonging to him, seized during the search.

In the 2.5 years since November 30, 2021, there do not appear to have been any hearings on the diamond prosecutor case at the Obolon Court or elsewhere. (I have been unable to locate any reference in a diligent search of local media using Ukrainian search terms.)

Conclusions

It is now almost nine years since the original arrest in the “diamond prosecutor” case - more than eight years since Shokin’s removal - and the “diamond prosecutor” case remains undecided. It appears almost certain that the case will expire in 2025 with the statute of limitations.

Despite all the complaints by Kasko, Sakvarelidze and the State Department, more work was done on the diamond prosecutor case under Shokin’s tenure (together with momentum carrying through the next few months) than during the next eight years. During Shokin’s tenure, the criminal investigation of the diamond prosecutors was carried out under the direction of Sakvarelidze and Kasko; the indictment had been handed down; the panel of judges had been appointed, the defendants arraigned and court examination of witnesses had begun.

After Shokin’s removal, the case became inactive, gradually at first and then more or less totally. In the past five years - during the entire Zelensky presidency - the case has been somnolent: court examination of only one witness is publicly documented. (And that witness had already testified five years earlier.)

More or less the opposite of the obfuscation later asserted by George Kent and State Department officials.

Also, while multiple State Dept officials cited the importance of the “diamond prosecutor” case as justification for firing Shokin, none of them seem to have taken any interest in the outcome of the case after Shokin was fired. One has to wonder why the diamond prosecutor case was only of interest to the State Department when it was used to remove Shokin, but not of interest to them under successor prosecutors.

It appears plausible that the two prosecutors were corrupt. Like nearly every other Ukrainian official except (possibly) Shokin himself. But were they guilty of the specific extortion from the sand mining company with which they were charged? Thus far, none of the witnesses attested in public reporting linked the two accused prosecutors to the extortion. Even Valentyn Rak, the convicted fraud who was the prosecution’s key witness, did not identify the two accused prosecutors. And Rak’s conviction and imprisonment for a prior fraud opens an obvious defense - if, by chance, the prosecution rests its case prior to the expiry of the statute of limitations. It is surprising that, after nine years, prosecutor Simonov (one of Sakvarelidze’s original team) apparently hasn’t presented any evidence from the covert surveillance.

There’s one other large unanswered question in this affair. The animus of Pyatt (and his U.S. embassy staff) towards Shokin evidenced in Pyatt’s September 2015 seems extraordinarily disproportionate to Shokin’s actual conduct in summer 2015. But the timing is too early relative to the subsequent (late October 2015) Burisma demand for deliverables. The evidence of State Department officials on this issue has to be parsed carefully, since they tended to conflate later events (subsequent to the U.S. declaration against Shokin) with events as they stood at the time of Pyatt’s speech. I’ll discuss this issue in a follow-up post.

What does seem certain is that it was a fool’s errand for U.S. embassy officials to try to determine personnel decisions in the Ukrainian Prosecutor General Office, based on their favoritism for opportunists like Kasko and Sakvarelidze, who had agendas of their own.

1. https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2016/03/2/7100854/

2. https://www.unian.info/politics/1097419--500000-discovered-during-searches-of-arrested-prosecutors.html; https://web.archive.org/web/20160110231535/https://twitter.com/ServiceSsu/status/618020389428568064

3. https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2016/03/2/7100854/

4. https://zn.ua/ECONOMICS/sovladelcem-neftebazy-brsm-nafta-v-vasilkove-byl-byvshiy-zamgenprokurora-glava-sbu-179292_.html

5. https://www.unian.net/politics/1089111-nalivaychenko-poluchil-otkaz-ap-otnositelno-vizita-v-ssha-i-povestku-na-dopros-lubkivskiy.html

6. https://zn.ua/POLITICS/nalivaychenko-nazval-zamgenprokurora-kryshevavshego-mahinacii-sgorevshey-brsm-nafty-179481_.html

7. https://golos.ua/news/zamgenprokurora-danilenko-krysheval-mahinatsii-na-sgorevshej-brsm-nafta-nalivajchenko

8. https://censor.net/en/news/340200/poroshenko_confirmed_sbu_head_nalyvaichenko_resignation_ukraiinska_pravda_source

9. https://lb.ua/news/2015/06/16/308384_valentin_nalivaychenko_voni.html

10. https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-will-get-the-truth-on-corruption-11570745983

11. https://www.facebook.com/petroporoshenko/photos/a.474415552692842/645622805572115/?type=3&ref=embed_post

12. https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=648924438575285&set=a.474415552692842

13. https://archive.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/editorial/shokin-must-go-393086.html

14. https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/politics/2015/07/150715_prosecutors_conflict_sd; https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2015/07/14/7074500/

https://web.archive.org/web/20150804025634/http://www.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=159219

15. https://web.archive.org/web/20150804025634/http://www.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=159219

16. https://news.liga.net/politics/interview/vitaliy_kasko_sledstvie_po_shapakinu_i_korniytsu_pytayutsya_dobit; https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/files/0/f/0f93773--3025-on-special-confiscation-proceedings.comments-regarding-draft-law-no.pdf

17. https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Remarks-by-US-Ambassador-Geoffrey-Pyatt-at-the-Odesa-Financial-Forum-on-September-24-2015-ukraine.pdf; https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/09/25/7082613/

18. https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/exclusive/1498575-zakonoproekt-t-chornovol-schodo-spetskonfiskatsiyi-vigidniy-dlya-v-yanukovicha-predstavnik-venetsianskoyi-komisiyi;

19. https://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/chornovol/560e6b6ec10be/

20. https://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/chornovol/560e6b6ec10be/

21. https://www.unian.info/politics/1155213-sakvarelidze-investigators-discover-new-illegal-activities-of-diamond-prosecutor.html

22. https://twitter.com/ClimateAudit/status/1705965315639631921

23. https://censor.net/en/news/367866/indictment_against_diamond_prosecutors_filed_to_court_this_case_is_barometer_of_highranking_corruption

24. https://photo.unian.info/theme/63759-zasedanie-goloseevskogo-raysuda-kieva-po-delu-brilliantovyh-prokurorov.html

25. https://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/chornovol/56531dd718578/

26. https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2016/03/24/7103208/

27. https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/politics/2016/05/160510_prosecutors_court_vc; https://news.liga.net/politics/news/na_sude_po_delu_brilliantovykh_prokurorov_doprashivayut_svideteley;https://censor.net/ua/news/387825/vymagaly_200_tysyach_schob_pytannya_bulo_znyato_na_rivni_oblasnoyi_ta_generalnoyi_prokuratur_sud_dopytav;

28. https://gordonua.com/news/politics/Konstantinovskiy-Mne-uzhe-napisali-tri-cheloveka-gotovye-rasskazat-o-vymogatelstve-prokurorami-gorazdo-bolshih-summ-89016.html

29. https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/politics/2016/05/160510_prosecutors_court_vc; https://news.liga.net/politics/news/na_sude_po_delu_brilliantovykh_prokurorov_doprashivayut_svideteley; https://sudreporter.org/diamantovi-prokurory-dopyt-kliuchov/

30. https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/politics/2016/05/160510_prosecutors_court_vc

31. https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/politics/2016/05/160510_prosecutors_court_vc

32. https://www.unian.info/society/1374130-witness-in-diamond-prosecutors-case-discloses-200000-bribe-details.html; https://tsn.ua/ru/politika/svidetel-rasskazal-kak-brilliantovye-prokurory-poluchili-ogromnuyu-vzyatku-647529.html

33. https://news.liga.net/politics/news/delo_brilliantovykh_prokurorov_doprosheny_lish_15_svideteley_iz_60

34. https://news.liga.net/politics/news/delo_brilliantovykh_prokurorov_doprosheny_lish_15_svideteley_iz_60

35. https://censor.net/ua/news/409156/u_spravi_diamantovyh_prokuroriv_uje_dopytano_30_svidkiv_ale_cherez_zaminu_suddi_rozglyad_moje_pochatysya

36. https://sudreporter.org/lukavstvo-u-spravi-diamantovyh-prokuroriv/

37. https://lb.ua/society/2017/02/28/359979_rukovoditel_operatsii_zaderzhaniyu.html

38. https://censor.net/ua/news/440398/sud_tretiyi_misyats_ne_moje_zibratysya_u_spravi_diamantovyh_prokuroriv

39. https://censor.net/ru/news/452482/gpu_doprosila_v_sude_po_delu_brilliantovyh_prokurorov_sotrudnika_prokuratury_kotoryyi_nichego_ne_znaet

40. https://censor.net/ru/photo_news/462643/sud_doprosil_pervogo_zamprokurora_kievschiny_grabtsa_kotoryyi_ne_podtverdil_polucheniya_vzyatki_brilliantovymi; https://censor.net/ru/photo_news/462643/sud_doprosil_pervogo_zamprokurora_kievschiny_grabtsa_kotoryyi_ne_podtverdil_polucheniya_vzyatki_brilliantovymi

41. https://sudreporter.org/svidky-ihnoruiut-zasidannia-u-spravi/

42. https://sudreporter.org/diamantovi-prokurory-dopyt-kliuchov/

43. https://sudreporter.org/diamantovi-html/

44. https://sudreporter.org/lukavstvo-u-spravi-diamantovyh-prokuroriv/

45. https://sudreporter.org/diamantovi-prokurory-do-holovnoho-svidka-zastosuyut-pryvid/

46. https://sudreporter.org/klyuchovyy-svidok-u-spravi-diamantovykh-prokuroriv-likuyet-sya-u-psykhiatrychniy-likarni/

47. https://sudreporter.org/svidok-u-spravi-diamantovykh-prokuroriv-vyiavyvsia-zdorovym-ale-zasidannia-vse-odno-ne-vidbulosia/

48. https://sudreporter.org/sud-vkotre-ne-zmih-provesty-zasidannia-u-spravi-diamantovykh-prokuroriv/

49. http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/83335652; https://sudreporter.org/verkhovnyy-sud-zberih-vyrok-yakym-zasudzheno-klyuchovoho-svidka-u-spravi-diamantovykh-prokuroriv/

50. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ruslan_Riaboshapka

51. https://gordonua.com/ukr/news/politics/-sprava-diamantovih-prokuroriv-peredali-v-antikoruptsijnij-sud-1312709.html

52. https://sudreporter.org/spravu-diamantovykh-prokuroriv-sprobuyut-skeruvaty-do-antykoruptsiynoho-sudu/

53. https://sudreporter.org/holosiivskyj-sud-zbuvsia-spravy-diamantovykh-prokuroriv-ii-poprosyly-vidpravyty-v-antykoruptsijnyj/; https://gordonua.com/ukr/news/politics/-sprava-diamantovih-prokuroriv-peredali-v-antikoruptsijnij-sud-1312709.html

54. https://sudreporter.org/diamantovykh-prokuroriv-nepravyl-no-spryamuvaly-do-antykoruptsiynoho-sudu/

55. https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/85380370; https://detective-info.com.ua/spravu-diamantovix-prokuroriv-povtorno-skeruvali-do-antikorupczijnogo-sudu.html; https://sudreporter.org/sprava-diamantovykh-prokuroriv-nadijshla-v-antykoruptsijnyj-sud/

56. https://censor.net/ru/news/3162739/vaks_vernul_delo_brilliantovyh_prokurorov_v_goloseevskiyi_rayisud_kieva_obvinitelnyyi_akt_nachnut_rassmatrivat

57. https://lb.ua/news/2020/02/18/450264_delo_brilliantovih_prokurorov.html; https://sudreporter.org/sprava-diamantovyh-prokuroriv-pominyala-sud-cherez-neefektyvnist-rozglyadu-i-porushennya-strokiv/

58. https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/news/press-releases/committees-release-george-kent-s-deposition-transcript-as-part-of-impeachment

59. https://tsn.ua/ru/ukrayina/neeffektivnost-i-narushenie-srokov-delo-brilliantovyh-prokurorov-snova-peredali-v-drugoy-sud-1493565.html

60. https://sudreporter.org/lukavstvo-u-spravi-diamantovyh-prokuroriv/

61. https://tsn.ua/ru/ukrayina/vot-vam-i-pravosudie-venediktova-i-sakvarelidze-obyasnili-pochemu-net-prigovora-po-delu-brilliantovyh-prokurorov-1771921.html; https://sudreporter.org/sud-nad-diamantovymy-prokuroramy-cherez-5-rokiv-pochynayetsya-spochatku/

62. https://sudreporter.org/sud-nad-diamantovymy-prokuroramy-cherez-5-rokiv-pochynayetsya-spochatku/

63. https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/95126700; https://sudreporter.org/sud-nad-diamantovymy-prokuroramy-cherez-5-rokiv-pochynayetsya-spochatku/

64. https://sudreporter.org/zavolodinnya-sbushnymy-6-tysyachamy-dolariv-dlya-dachi-habara-prypysuyut-kolyshnomu-slidchomu-zi-spravy-diamantovyh-prokuroriv/; https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2016/03/24/7103147/;

65. https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/os-vam-i-pravosuddya-venediktova-i-sakvarelidze-poyasnili-chomu-nemaye-viroku-u-spravi-diamantovih-prokuroriv-1771921.html

66. https://sudreporter.org/sud-nad-diamantovymy-prokuroramy-cherez-5-rokiv-pochynayetsya-spochatku/; https://lb.ua/society/2021/06/18/487398_svidki_spravi_diamantovih.html

67. https://sudreporter.org/hotily-znyaty-naprugu-na-rivni-prokuratury-sud-dopytav-pershogo-svidka-u-spravi-diamantovyh-prokuroriv/

68. Other descriptions of the mob:

Rak: I heard from Kirylenko on the phone that there were checks... by unknown people in masks and sports suits.

Kyrylenko: When 50 people from Azov with law enforcement agencies arrive, overturn your car and cut the wheels, and the law enforcement agency is behind it. What do you think the pressure is?!

Konstantinovsky: According to the people's deputy, he soon arrived at the enterprise and saw people in balaclavas there, who allegedly admitted that their actions were being coordinated by representatives of the prosecutor's office.

Savarelidze: He said that the situation was unclear, some people in balaclavas were conducting a search, taking out equipment things, the equipment was then sprayed

69. https://censor.net/ua/news/3302491/sprava_diamantovyh_prokuroriv_zasidannya_vidklaly_cherez_vidsutnist_odnogo_z_obvynuvachenyh

70. https://ukrreporter.com.ua/politic/diamantovomu-prokuroru-ogolosyly-pidozru-za-sprobu-povernuty-gotivku-video.html